at wikipedia:
A race hazard (or race condition) is a flaw in a system or process where the output exhibits unexpected critical dependence on the relative timing of events. The term originates with the idea of two signals racing each other to influence the output first.
Race hazards occur in poorly-designed electronics systems, especially logic circuits, but they may also arise in computer software.
...
Computing
Race hazards may arise in software, especially when communicating between separate processes or threads of execution.
Here is a simple example:
Let us assume that two threads T1 and T2 each want to increment the value of a global integer by one.
If the two threads run simultaneously without locking or synchronization, the outcome of the operation could be wrong
- Integer i = 0;
- T1 reads the value of i into a register : 0
- T2 reads the value of i into a register : 0
- T1 increments the value of i : 0 + 1 = 1
- T2 increments the value of i : 0 + 1 = 1
The final value of i is 1 instead of the expected result of 2.
For another example, consider the following two tasks, in pseudocode:
global integer A = 0;
task Received()
{
A = A + 1;
print "RX";
}
task Timeout() // Print only the even numbers
{
if (A is divisible by 2)
{
print A;
}
}
task Received is activated whenever an interrupt is received from the serial controller, and increments the value of A.
task Timeout occurs every second. If A is divisible by 2, it prints A. Output would look something like:
0
0
0
RX
RX
2
RX
RX
4
4
Now consider this chain of events, which might occur next:
- timeout occurs, activating task Timeout
- task Timeout evaluates
A
and finds it is divisible by 2, so elects to execute the "print A" next. - data is received on the serial port, causing an interrupt and a switch to task Received
- task Received runs to completion, incrementing A and printing "RX"
- control returns to task Timeout
- task timeout executes print A, using the current value of A, which is 5.
Mutexes are used to address this problem in concurrent programming.
In filesystems, File locking provides a commonly-used solution. A more cumbersome remedy involves reorganizing the system in such a way that one unique process (running a daemon or the like) has exclusive access to the file, and all other processes that need to access the data in that file do so only via interprocess communication with that one process (which of course requires synchronization at the process level).
In networking, consider a distributed chat network like IRC, where a user acquires channel-operator privileges in any channel he starts. If two users on different servers, on different ends of the same network, try to start the same-named channel at the same time, each user's respective server will grant channel-operator privileges to each user, since neither server will yet have received the other server's signal that it has allocated that channel. (Note that this problem has been largely solved by various IRC server implementations.)
In this case of a race hazard, the concept of the "shared resource" covers the state of the network (what channels exist, as well as what users started them and therefore have what privileges), which each server can freely change as long as it signals the other servers on the network about the changes so that they can update their conception of the state of the network. However, the latency across the network makes possible the kind of race condition described. In this case, heading off race conditions by imposing a form of control over access to the shared resource—say, appointing one server to control who holds what privileges—would mean turning the distributed network into a centralized one (at least for that one part of the network operation). Where users find such a solution unacceptable, a pragmatic solution can have the system 1) recognize when a race hazard has occurred; and 2) repair the ill effects.
A race condition exemplifies an anti-pattern.
A particularly poignant example of a race condition was one of the problems that plagued the Therac-25 (a Life-critical system) accidents. Another example is the Energy Management System used by Ohio-based FirstEnergy Corp., that had a race condition in the alarm subsystem; when three sagging power lines were tripped simultaneously, the condition prevented alerts being raised to the monitoring technicians. This software flaw eventually led to the North American Blackout of 2003.
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